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PARETO EFFICIENCY IN INTERNATIONAL TAXATION
Abstract
This paper addresses a key but neglected task in the theory of
international taxation, lent increased urgency by growing awareness of the
potential gains from tax coordination: the characterization of Pareto-
efficient  international tax regimes. It shows that the Diamond-Mirrlees
theorem on the desirability of production efficiency, which underlies the
key tenets of policy advice in international taxation – the desirability of
destination basis for commodity taxation, of the residence principle for
capital income taxation, and of free trade –  is rendered inherently
inapplicable to problems of international tax design by the distinctness of
national budget constraints  that is of the essence in thinking about
international taxation. Conditions  are established –  relating to the
availability of explicit or implicit devices  for reallocating tax revenues
across countries –  under which production e fficiency is nevertheless
desirable, and a general characterization developed of the precise ways
in which Pareto-efficient international taxation may require violation of
established tenets.












A key task in the theory of public nance is to characterize the set of Pareto-ecient
tax structures. Starting with the analysis of Pareto-ecient commodity taxation by
Harris (1979) and continuing through a wide range of papers inspired by Stiglitz'
(1982) treatment of non-linear taxation, this task has received considerable attention
in the context of closed economies comprising several distinct types of person. Yet the
international form of this general task|characterizing the set of tax-spending policies
that are Pareto-ecient in terms of countries' distinct national interests|appears not
to have been addressed. This is especially striking given both the evident practical
importance of understanding the conditions that must be satised for international
tax arrangements to be Pareto ecient and the rapid growth of policy and analytical
interest in this area over the last decade or so. Indeed the literature appears to have
arrived at some articles of faith as to proper practice in international taxation without
even considering whether or not they are consistent with the minimal requirement of
Pareto eciency. The purpose in this paper is to rst argue that there is indeed a
fundamental intellectual gap to be lled in developing principles for Pareto eciency
in international taxation, and then to go some way towards doing so.
The strange neglect of this issue1 may reect a view that the fundamental lessons of
many-person tax theory|including in particular the Diamond-Mirrlees theorem on
the desirability of production eciency, which will be a particular concern here|can
be translated directly into many-country contexts by the simple device of thinking of
countries as people. But that is not so. There is a fundamental dierence between
tax design in a many-country world and in a single country. In the latter case, there
is naturally only a single government budget constraint to consider. In many-country
settings, in contrast, each government will have its own distinct revenue constraint:
that, indeed, is close to being a denition of an independent sovereign state. Of
course some countries do in practice make unrequited transfers to others; and there
are others within which the revenue constraint of general government is less than fully
consolidated as between, for instance, central and lower-level jurisdictions.
While it thus somewhat overstates matters to think of each country as having a single
budget constraint entirely independent of those faced by other countries, such a view
1Exceptions|from which this paper arises|are Wildasin (1977) and Keen and Smith (1996).
Ebrill and Slutsky (1989, 1990) address some issues of regulatory design in hierarchical industrial
structures that have similarities with the question addressed here. They examine, for instance, the
implications for optimal policy of there being distinct revenue constraints for distinct regulated sec-
tors, which has an obvious analogy with the distinctness of national revenue constraints stressed here.
The two settings and concerns are otherwise fundamentally dissimilar, but there is an interesting res-
onance between their results and some of those here. The importance of budget constraints in the
analysis of distortionary taxation and public-sector pricing is emphasized in the title of Boiteux's
classic (1956) paper on the subject; our analysis, which focuses on the multiple budget constraints of
dierent countries, has parallel implications for public-sector pricing by multiple public-sector enter-
prises. (For the reasons noted below, the issues arising from the multiplicity of revenue constraints
for public enterprises are perhaps less acute than in the international context, but further exploration
of this topic in future research would be desirable.) More recently, the importance of the distinctness
of national budget constraints has been recognized by Blackorby and Brett (1999) and Kotsogiannis
and Makris (1999).
1clearly captures an important aspect of international tax matters: the countries of the
world do not pool their tax revenue.
The implications for tax analysis of this obvious observation are profound. Consider,
in particular the classic Diamond-Mirrlees theorem (Diamond and Mirrlees (1971),
Theorem 4): that any Pareto ecient tax structure is characterized by production
eciency so long as any pure prots are taxed at 100 percent and there are no re-
strictions on the distorting tax instruments that can be deployed. This has proved
one of the most powerful results of optimal tax theory.2 But the proof of the the-
orem presumes there to be only a single government budget constraint. Thus, the
Diamond-Mirrlees (DM) theorem simply does not apply in international settings.3
This has potentially profound implications. Consider, for instance, what are perhaps
the three central tenets in the normative theory of international taxation:
 The destination principle for commodity taxation (according to which commodi-
ties are taxed according to where they are consumed) is superior to the origin
principle (under which they are taxed according to where produced)
 The residence principle for capital income taxation (under which taxation is by
the country in which the investor resides) is preferable to the source principle
(taxation by the country in which the income arises); and
 Free trade is better than restricted trade.
Of course it is well-known that these are not universal truths. There are many circum-
stances in which one or all of these claims is incorrect. Origin taxation can be superior
to destination, for instance, if taxes are set non-cooperatively (Lockwood, 1993) or in
the presence of imperfect competition (Keen and Lahiri, 1996); an element of source
taxation may be desirable when rents cannot be fully taxed (Huizinga-Neilsen (1997),
Keen and Piekkola (1997)); and there are familiar arguments that can, in principle, be
used to justify protectionist trade policies|administrative constraints on the ability
of governments to collect taxes on domestic transactions (see Devarajan et al. 1996),
second-best environmental-policy considerations, or market imperfections or external-
ities, (e.g., Adam Smith's infant industry argument or its modern descendants) can
all provide at least a theoretical rationale for trade interventions. Nevertheless, these
three tenets are widely accepted as central benchmarks by which much policy advice in
the area of international taxation is framed: the perceived preferability of destination
taxation, for example, has been a powerful consideration in the policy advice given to
the CIS countries and in discussions of the denitive VAT regime for the European
2For example, it has provided much of the intellectual basis for replacing the cascading turnover
taxes previously found in many developing and transition economies by the VAT, which, in particular,
does not tax intermediate transactions.
3The setting of the DM theorem also precludes an important feature of reality in international
taxation by presuming that all consumers face the same prices, a point stressed by Homburg (1998).
But in this respect the problem of international tax design is evidently less constrained than the
regular DM one, so that one would not on this account expect the desirability of production eciency
to be over-turned; and Proposition 2(a) below veries that it is not.
2Union. And much discussion of capital income tax coordination begins with the view
that the issue has substance only because residence taxation is administratively in-
feasible (Tanzi (1995)). But the interest the profession attaches to these `exceptions
to the rule' testies to the central role played by these basic tenets of international
taxation.
The important and troubling common feature of these tenets, for present purposes, is
that such intellectual appeal as they possess seems|especially in the rst two cases|
to derive largely from the view, sometimes made explicit,4 that they are essentially
just applications of the DM theorem. The destination principle, for instance, treats
all rms equally, irrespective of their location, and so will ensure (in a competitive
market, and in the absence of other distortions) that all rms have the same marginal
cost of production in equilibrium, and hence that the global allocation of production
is ecient. Under the origin principle, in contrast, arbitrage by consumers will en-
sure that consumer prices are equated across countries (so that there is consumption
eciency); but then rms in dierent locations will face dierent net prices if they
face dierent origin-based taxes, and the allocation of production will be inecient.
Very similar arguments apply to the comparison between residence and source taxes:
under the latter, consumers in all countries will require the same net of return on
their investments, so that pre-tax rates will dier across countries in the presence of
unequal source-based taxes; residence taxation, in contrast, leaves intertemporal con-
sumer prices diering across countries, but pre-tax returns equated. And free trade
ensures production eciency|in the absence of origin-based taxes|by ensuring that
producers in all countries face the same prices.5
Appealing as these arguments appear to be, the distinctness of national revenue con-
straints that is of the essence in the international context means that the DM theorem
cannot be used to provide formal justication for them.6 This observation thus re-
moves what appears to be a central intellectual underpinning of these ideas: contrary
to apparently widespread belief, none of them can be rationalized by appealing to the
Diamond-Mirrlees theorem. Consequently, none is as trustworthy as has been widely
believed.
The task of characterizing Pareto ecient international tax structures thus remains
both open and pressing. Does production eciency continue to be desirable even when
distinct countries face distinct revenue constraints? If not, what features do Pareto
ecient structures possess? Are there any general principles for international tax
design better founded than the three tenets above but equally practicable for guiding
policy formation? These are the questions to which the remainder of the paper is
addressed.
Section 2 below presents a theoretical framework within which the problem of Pareto-
4See, for example, Keen (1993) and Giovannini (1989).
5The link between free trade and the production eciency theorem is well-known: see DM (pp.
25{26) and many others, e.g., Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1974), and Stern (1987).
6Of course the conditions of the DM theorem are far from trivial even in a closed economy (and
indeed the counterexamples to the tenets cited above all involve some violation of those conditions).
The problem raised here, however, is of a quite dierent kind: it is that the economic environment
presumed in the proof of the DM theorem is inherently inapposite in international settings.
3ecient taxation in an international setting can be investigated. This framework is
essentially the Arrow-Debreu model of competitive general equilibrium, used by Dia-
mond and Mirrlees, recast in an international context. Section 3 presents the principal
results and|harder|develops the intuition behind them. Section 4 discusses the im-
plications of the analysis for policy and for future research, and Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
The framework within which we address the issues raised in the Introduction is an
essentially standard competitive trade model, augmented to allow countries to deploy
both destination-based commodity taxes and taris, and|crucially|to recognize dis-
tinct revenue constraints for the distinct countries. This provides a very general set-
ting; we shall spell out, in particular, the way in which it encompasses all three of the
central specic questions of principle referred to above.
The world consists of S countries. In each there are L  T + N commodities: the
rst T are tradable, the rest|including, in particular, internationally immobile factors
like labor, as well as non-traded consumption goods like housing|are not. There is
in each country s a single representative consumer with preferences described by an
expenditure function es(qs;gs;us) dened over the L-vector7 of consumer prices qs, an
L-vector of publicly provided goods gs and utility us.8 Consumer prices are partitioned
in obvious notation between those relating to tradables and non-tradables as qs 
(qs0
T;qs0
N)0. Since the focus of interest is eciency in relation to internationally mobile
goods and factors, and without loss of generality, there is assumed to be production
eciency within countries.9 The production technology in each country can therefore
be described by a prot function s(ps) dened on the L-vector of producer prices ps0 
(ps0
T;ps0
N)0. For the same reason, we abstract from issues related to public production by
supposing that the public provision gs  (gs
T;gs
N) simply arises from public purchases
of that amount.10 Commodity taxes (on a destination basis) in country s are ts 
qs   ps. World prices of the T tradable goods, which are of course common to all
countries, are given by the T-vector !. Taris are s  ps
T   !. Thus s
i > 0 means
an import tari if i is imported, and an export subsidy if it is exported. Note too|a
point of some importance for later intuition|that while world prices ! are something
7All vectors are column vectors, and a prime indicates transposition. Superscripts refer to
countries.
8The assumption of a representative household in each country means that none of our results
hinge on the unavailability of policy instruments to achieve desired distributions of income within
countries. The immobility of labor is implicit in this assumption, a restriction which substantially
simplies the model but which does not aect the substance of our analysis.
9As shown in Wildasin (1977), the standard DM argument applies to the private and public
production sectors within countries: an optimal tax structure entails no taxation of intermediate
good transactions among private-sector producers within countries, and public-sector production in
each country should use local producer prices as shadow values. Hence, for our purposes, there is no
loss of generality in aggregating the entire production sector in each country.
10The utility function is thus dened over inputs to the public-sector production process; the
technology through which these inputs produce public goods and services valued by the consumer is
thus subsumed within the form of the expenditure function.
4of a ction in the sense that no private agent may trade at them, they do matter for
the revenues that national governments collect.
To isolate the implications for the desirability of production eciency of the distinct
source of failure of the DM theorem emphasized above|the distinct national revenue
constraints|we assume throughout that all other conditions of that theorem are sat-
ised. Pure prots are thus assumed to be taxed at 100 percent. Consumers then
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T  @es=@qT, T  @s=@pT (a notational convention for price derivatives
that we shall use throughout) and s denotes a T-vector of unrequited transfers that
country s makes to the rest of the world, with
P
s s = 0T, where 0k denotes the
k-vector of zeros. These lump-sum international transfers are introduced mainly as
an expositional device: the case of primary interest is that in which all s are zero.
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s) = 0N; s = 1;:::;S : (4)
The system comprising (1){(4) is homogeneous of degree zero in each of the qs, each
of the ps and in !. Without loss of generality, we therefore take the rst tradable as
a numeraire commodity, bearing no tax or tari in any country: that is, in obvious
notation, qs
1 = ps
1 = !1 = 1, 8i. To simplify matters still further, we assume that in
each country income eects attach only to, that the government only purchases, and
that transfers only occur in, good 1.11 To remove a further inessential complication,
we suppose too that the provision of public goods does not aect the compensated
demands for any good other than the numeraire (see Wildasin (1979)). The typical





















11Attaching all income eects to the numeraire also enables us to preclude transfer-type consid-
erations associated with income eects that would otherwise obscure the main argument. Thus, in
particular, the results to follow do not derive from the eects of the international distribution of
income on the equilibrium world price structure that have featured prominently in the long debate
over the \transfer problem" in international economics (see Bhagwati et al. (1983) for discussion and
further references).
12We abuse the notation slightly by henceforth using q and p to refer to the L   1 non-numeraire
goods and by interpreting s as a scalar relating to transfers of good 1.










s)g = 0T 1 : (6)
Equilibrium is thus described by the system (1), (4), (5) and (6).
This framework is very general{suciently so, in particular, to encompass all three sets
of issues raised in the Introduction. Destination-based commodity taxes and taris
appear directly as t and  respectively; origin-based taxes appear implicitly, being
equivalent to destination-based consumption taxes and export taxes/import subsidies
levied at the same rate.13 Issues of capital income taxation can be addressed by
interpreting one of the traded goods|or several, in a model of sector-specic types
of capital|as mobile capital, used only as an intermediate good and with the cost
of capital in s given by the corresponding element(s) of ps; residence-based taxes on
capital income are then reected in the discount factor embedded in the intertemporal
price structure within qs.
The analysis proceeds by rst perturbing the equilibrium conditions and then applying
a theorem of the alternative to characterize Pareto ecient structures.
For the perturbation, setting es




























where ms  es
T   s






































where eTq is (T   1)  (L   1). Perturbing (6) and (4) and stacking the result with
(8), one arrives at the system
Ju:du = Jq:dq + Jp:dp + J!:d! + J:d (12)























13More precisely, the model developed in the text is equivalent|including in terms of the revenue
raised, as is apparent from (5)|to one in which there are no destination-based commodity taxes, but
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By Motzkin's theorem of the alternative,14 an initial equilibrium is either Pareto ine-
cient in the weak sense that15 du > 0S for some perturbation (dq;dp;d!;d) satisfying
(12) or there exists some (T 1+S(1+N))-vector y such that y:0Ju << 0 and y0:Jk = 0
for each of the matrices Jk, k = q;p;! and, when transfers are allowed, for k = .
It helps interpretation to partition y = (z0;x0;x10;:::;xS0)0 where z is an S-vector, x
a (T   1)-vector and the xs are all N-vectors. Note then (using the denition of Ju)
that one implication of the latter alternative is that z << 0, the weights  zs > 0 then
bearing interpretation as the implicit weights in a social welfare function  szsus that
is maximized by the Pareto ecient allocation being characterized.
14Mangasarian (1994), p. 34.
15The notation k >> 0 means that all elements of the vector k are strictly positive, k > 0 that all
are non-negative and at least one strictly positive.
73 Pareto ecient international tax structures
This section seeks to characterize Pareto ecient international tax structures. Given
the central importance that the Diamond-Mirrlees theorem has come to have in policy
design and evaluation, we focus in particular on the question of whether or not Pareto
ecient international taxation requires production eciency in the use and production
of mobile goods and factors: that is, on whether Pareto eciency requires ps
T =
pT in all countries. Except where indicated, we assume|in order to capture the
distinctness of national budget constraints that motivates the analysis|that the lump
sum transfers s cannot be deployed: the instruments at the planner's disposal are
thus q, p, and !.
We start with a fairly bald statement of the formal results themselves (relegating
proofs to the Appendix), and then turn to the more dicult task of developing the
economic intuition underlying them.
3.1 Results
The following establishes two key features of any Pareto ecient allocation:
PROPOSITION 1: At any Pareto ecient allocation, in every country s:
(a) (Ramsey rule) ts:0es
qq = ses0
q , where s   (1 + es
g)=es
g; and
(b) (Collinearity of tari vectors) s = s, with s  (1=zses
g) > 0.
Proof: See Appendix A.
The interpretation of Proposition 1 is straightforward. Part (a) calls for destination-
based consumption taxes to be set in accordance with the Ramsey rule, whose opti-
mality in closed economies is familiar.16 This will typically require, of course, that
consumer prices vary across countries.
Part (b) of the proposition is more striking. Remember that producers in country s
face prices ps = ! + s. It follows that production will be ecient if and only if the
tari vectors s are the same for all countries. Since there is in general no reason to
suppose that  = 0, nor that zses
g takes the same value for all s, the implication is
that production eciency is typically not a requirement for Pareto eciency. Instead,
producer prices for tradable goods ps
T must generally dier across countries.
Notice, even more intriguingly, that any production ineciency takes a very particular
form: the tari vectors of the various countries are collinear at any Pareto ecient
allocation. That is, all countries set the same relative tari rates, diering only in the
level at which taris are set.
Proposition 1 is derived under the assumption that lump-sum international transfers
16Note that the absence of supply responses from the rule in (a) reects the assumed taxation of
pure prots at 100 percent (see Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1972) and Auerbach (1985)).
8are not possible. If such transfers can be used, however, any Pareto-ecient structure
of scal policies will require production eciency. The same is sometimes true even
in the absence of lump-sum transfers:
PROPOSITION 2: All Pareto ecient allocations are characterized by production
eciency if either:
(a) International lump sum transfers can be deployed; or
(b) The matrix of net import vectors M (dened in (18) above) has maximal
column rank.
Proof: See Appendix B.
Proposition 2 does not, of course, imply that there exist Pareto ecient allocations
marked by production ineciency, merely that such allocations can exist only if con-
ditions (a) or (b) fail. It can be shown by example, however, that there do exist such
allocations:17 that is, the possibility that Pareto eciency in international taxation
will entail production ineciency is a real one.
3.2 Intuition
To explain the economic meaning and intuition behind these results, it is helpful to
begin by considering part (a) of Proposition 2. Formally, this result is a trivial ex-
tension of the Diamond-Mirrlees theorem. When lump-sum transfers among countries
are feasible, their separate government budget constraints are, in eect, merged into
a single global government budget constraint. In this case, the only dierence be-
tween the optimal taxation problem with many countries that we analyze here and
the standard DM optimal tax model is that, in the international tax version of the
problem, consumers in dierent countries may potentially face dierent prices, corre-
sponding to their respective national tax systems, whereas in the traditional model all
consumers face the same taxes. Thus it is possible to select dierent tax structures
for dierent consumers in the international context; and, in general, the optimal tax
structure may well involve higher taxes on traded goods in some countries as com-
pared with others. (For example, if the demand for a traded good such as wine is more
inelastic in Germany than in the US, the tax structure that produces equal percentage
reductions in demand for all commodities would (other things the same) entail heavier
taxation of wine in Germany than in the US.) Aside from this distinction, however,
the international taxation problem is fundamentally no dierent from the standard
DM problem when lump sum transfers between countries are possible. In this case,
intuition suggests, and Proposition 2(a) conrms, that international trade should not
be the subject of scal interventions like taris or subsidies since these would distort
the global pattern of production in an inecient fashion.
At rst sight, part (b) of Proposition 2 appears to bear little relation to part (a).
17Any such example is bound to be cumbersome{part (b) of Proposition 2 means that the simplest
will have at least three countries{so that details are omitted. An example is available on request.
9The rank condition in part (b) is simply that the net import vectors have as much
linear independence as possible (given that market-clearing requires them to add to
zero). This in turn requires that M have at least as many rows as it has column rank,
and hence that T  S. Very loosely speaking (in taking maximal rank for granted),
production eciency is desirable if there are at least as many tradable goods as there
are countries. To take one simple case, consider a world with just two countries.
The possibility of international trade presupposes the existence of at least two traded
goods and perhaps more. By Proposition 2(b), production eciency must therefore
characterize the Pareto-ecient tax structure in a two-country world, even if lump-sum
international transfers are not possible.
To see the connection between parts (a) and (b) of Proposition 2, it is only necessary
to note that trade policy|taxes and subsidies on trade ows|can eectively transfer
scal resources among countries in a lump-sum fashion, provided that there are at
least as many traded goods as countries and that the import/export vectors of all
countries are linearly independent. This is easiest to see in the case of two countries
and two traded goods. Suppose initially that there are no trade interventions at all, so
that the global pattern of production is ecient. Suppose that country A imports the
non-numeraire traded good 2 and let it impose an import tari A
2 > 0 while country
B imposes a subsidy of exactly equal magnitude on its exports of good 2, setting
B
2 = A
2 > 0. The eect of these trade policies is to transfer net scal resources from
country 2 to country 1, with no departure from globally-ecient production.18 In
other words, osetting taxes and subsidies on internationally-traded goods shift scal
revenues among countries but do not distort production. These ows could go in any
desired direction; for example, if country A subsidizes its imports of good 2 (i.e., it sets
A
2 < 0) and country B imposes a tax on its exports of good 2 (i.e., sets B
2 = A
2 < 0),
transfers would ow from country A to country B, again without disturbing production
eciency. Clearly, then, in the case of two countries with two traded goods, the
ability to undertake direct lump sum international transfers is superuous: any desired
transfers between the two countries can just as well be achieved by the use of osetting
trade policies, in which the country that collects a tax gains revenue at the expense
of the country that pays a subsidy.
The equivalence between trade interventions and lump-sum transfers obviously con-
tinues to hold if there are two countries and three or more traded goods; in this case,
taris/subsidies for all but one traded good can be set equal to zero, while instituting
osetting taxes/subsidies on the remaining traded good. If there are three or more
countries and if the number of traded goods is at least as large as the number of
countries, and if the net import vectors are linearly independent, then controlling the
taris and subsidies of each country appropriately provides enough degrees of freedom
to achieve any desired pattern of international scal transfers. More formally, note
from (5) that a perturbation of world prices d!, holding constant all consumer and
producer prices|and hence also all relevant behavioral decisions|implies an eective
18Keeping the other assumptions of this example unchanged, suppose that good 2 were chosen
as numeraire. In this case, country A is the exporter of the non-numeraire good. An export tax
imposed in country A, accompanied by an equal import subsidy in country B, would again transfer
scal resources from country B to country A without disturbing production eciency.
10pattern of international transfers given by the S-vector d = M:0d!, with (denoting
the vector of ones by ) the market-clearing condition (6) implying :0d = 0: If M
has its maximal possible column rank of S  1 then by manipulating world prices it is
therefore possible to achieve any de facto pattern of international lump-sum redistri-
bution that might be required.19 With non-distorting redistribution possible by this
indirect route, the potential rationale for using distorting taris to redistribute tax
revenues across countries vanishes. Production eciency is again desirable.
Once the equivalence is established between trade interventions (in the case T  S)
and lump-sum transfers, the intuition behind Proposition 2 becomes apparent. What,
then, of the case for production ineciency if the conditions of Proposition 2 are
not satised? This takes us back to Proposition 1 and the general characterization
provided there that is valid for any number of goods and countries. Proposition
1(a)|the Ramsey rule|is evident enough. To see the economics of Proposition 1(b),
it proves easiest to think of policy as maximizing the social welfare function -zsus,
where z is as in the alternative.
According to Proposition 1(b), any trade interventions that occur with Pareto-ecient
policies will leave global production eciency undisturbed, provided that zses
g, which
is strictly positive, takes the same value for all countries s. With zs interpreted as the
social weight attached to the welfare of country s, this term can be thought of as the
shadow value of scal resources in country s: the lower the value of tax revenue in
country s, the lower will be the (absolute value of) the marginal valuation of public









s = 0 (19)
so that countries' tari revenues sum to zero when weighted by the terms zses
g. Intu-
itively, taris are being used to redistribute revenues from countries which are disfa-
vored in the Pareto ecient allocation|in the sense that their zses
g is low|to those
that are favored. For the former, zses
gs:0ms would be negative, while the shadow-
value-weighted net tari revenue for the latter would be positive. Part (b) of Propo-
sition 1 indicates that, relative to a situation in which all countries set equal and
osetting taris and export subsidies of (so that production is ecient), a country
that is disfavored in the Pareto ecient allocation (i.e., one that is `scally rich,' in
the sense of having a low shadow value of government revenue) subsidizes imports
or exports more heavily, while a `scally poor' country (i.e., one with a high shadow
value of revenue) taxes imports or exports more lightly.
As we have already seen, these scal interventions in the markets for imports and
exports need not necessarily lead to production ineciency|not if the number of
traded goods is larger than the number of countries. But suppose the contrary; for
example, let there be three countries and two traded goods, such that countries A and
19In a similar spirit, Turunen-Red and Woodland (1996, Theorem 2) show that adjustment of
taris/subsidies on traded goods can be used to redistribute the eciency gains from reforms of
quotas on traded goods.
20This follows from the condition of the alternative that y:0J! = 0. For this implies that P
s zses
gms = 0T 1; premultiplying by  and using Proposition 1(b) gives (19) .
11B import commodity 2, which is exported by country C. Suppose, further, an initial
situation in which country A is very `scally poor' in the sense that government revenue
there is highly valued (the value of zAeA
g is very high), that the other importing country,
B, has a lower shadow value of government revenue (the value of zBeB
g is not so high),
and that the shadow value of government revenue in the exporting country C (the
value of zCeC
g is low) is low. If lump-sum international transfers were possible, Pareto-
ecient taxation would require that country C transfer scal resources to country A;
depending on the exact shadow values, country B might also receive some transfers
from country C or perhaps it would pay some transfers to country A. If such lump-
sum transfers are not possible, what sorts of trade interventions might achieve similar
results?
Following the logic of the two-country case, the \scally rich" or \disfavored" country
C could subsidize its exports of good 2 so as to transfer scal resources abroad. If both
countries A and B were to impose osetting import taris, they would then both be
the beneciaries of scal transfers from country C and production eciency would be
preserved. However, these policies are ineective in targeting transfers from country
C, with a low shadow value of revenue, to country A, the country with the highest
shadow value, since some of the subsidy paid by country C accrues to the government
of country B. Indeed, according to Proposition 1(b), country B, with its lower shadow
value of government revenue, should impose a higher tari on imports than country
A. This would have the eects of increasing the volume of trade and the volume of
scal transfers between country C and country A and of reducing the volume of trade
and transfers between C and B, thus directing country B's subsidies more eectively
toward the \favored" country A. While dierentiating the tari rates of countries A
and B serves this useful purpose, note that it also results in production ineciency:
the producer price of good 2 will be higher in the country (B) with the higher tari, as
compared with the other countries. This is the source of the production ineciency in
the general case: the production eciency is a price worth paying to achieve a desired
redistribution of tax revenue .
It now remains only to explain the collinearity between tari vectors that Proposition
1(b) shows to be required for Pareto ecient international taxation. For this, imagine
a small change in consumer prices q in countries A and B which has the sole eect of
increasing A's imports of good j by an amount dmA
j > 0 whilst reducing B's imports
of j by the same amount, dmB
j =  dmA
j . World prices and producer prices in all
countries remain unchanged; consumer prices have changed only in countries A and
B, and as an envelope property the changes there have negligible welfare eects. Thus
the only welfare eects are those arising from the impact on tari revenues in A and
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12which gives the collinearity of tari vectors. Loosely speaking, taris and subsidies on
traded goods serve as devices for transferring revenues between countries. Eective
deployment of these instruments requires simply scaling up or down a common vector
of taris: from the perspective of reallocating tax revenues, there is no point in varying
tari rates across countries in light of heterogeneities in their preferences or production
patterns.
4 Implications
The central implication of the results above is that the principles at the heart of
most policy advice on international tax design are generally not appropriate: there
are circumstances in which one must depart from production ineciency if one is to
attain a preferred point on the world's second-best utility possibility frontier, or to
ensure a Pareto gain from a desirable reform of domestic taxation within one country.
More precisely, Proposition 1 gives a conceptually simple scheme for attaining Pareto
eciency in international taxation: moving around the world's second-best utility
possibility frontier requires that commodity taxes be set at all times according to the
Ramsey rule and that inter-jurisdictional transfers be made by rescaling the tari
vector that each country deploys. Thus production eciency loses its primacy in
international settings. It might conceivably have been optimal, for instance, to retain
production eciency but move around the utility possibility frontier by restructuring
commodity taxes so as to trigger redistribution through changes in world prices; but,
in general, it is not. Even when all other conditions of the DM theorem are met,
the distinctness of national budget constraints|unless it can be overcome by inter-
jurisdictional transfers, explicit or implicit (as described in Proposition 2)|means that
in international settings production eciency ceases to be a prerequisite for Pareto
ecient taxation.
The reason why taris|which in this discussion should be thought of as simply a
surrogate for production ineciencies more generally|may have a role to play in
bringing about Pareto improvements is not hard to discern. Consider some initial
equilibrium in which commodity taxes in at least one country depart from the Ramsey
rule. Reforming commodity taxes so as to respect the Ramsey rule may change world
prices in such a way that some countries lose from the reform unless they receive
some form of compensation: and taris provide precisely the means to provide such
compensation. Indeed the key to understanding the results above on the circumstances
in which production ineciency may be desirable and the form it may then take has
been precisely to recognize the role that tari structures play in redistributing global
tax revenues across countries.
Of course distorting taris are an inecient way of redistributing revenue across coun-
tries, so that|even if one takes the view that nations will nd ways of achieving all
potential Pareto gains|these results do not necessarily provide a rationale for their
deployment in practice: if some redistribution of revenues is needed to ensure Pareto
gains from benecial reforms, would one not expect to see such redistribution achieved
by lump sum rather than distorting means? Part of the answer is surely that lump-
13sum redistribution between countries suers many of the diculties of asymmetric
information associated with lump-sum redistribution between individuals that give
rise to the traditional optimal tax problem. But part of the answer is also that some
such redistribution does in fact occur between countries.
Unrequited aid|whether in the form of bilateral foreign aid or in the form of transfers
brought about by multilateral agencies such as the World Bank|is one example of
such transfers, but perhaps not the most important. In the treatment of multinational
enterprises, the foreign tax credit oered by many developed countries serves precisely
to redistribute revenue from the treasury of the home country to that of the host
country. In the US, in particular, the opportunity to claim a credit against taxes due
on income repatriated to the US for taxes paid in the host country on income derived
there21 has long been a central feature in the taxation of foreign-source income. The
foreign income tax credit protects subsidiaries of US rms and other US taxpayers
from taxes imposed in foreign countries and provides US rms with an incentive to
invest wherever the before-tax rate of return on capital is highest. Advocates of the
foreign income tax credit see this as one of its important virtues because it promotes a
productively-ecient international allocation of capital. At the same time, the foreign
tax credit is often criticized from the viewpoint of US domestic policy interests because
it in eect allows foreign treasuries to collect source-based capital income taxes at the
expense of the US Treasury: every dollar's worth of creditable foreign taxes reduces
the ow of revenue to the US government by one dollar. Indeed it is a central concern
of corporate tax design in almost all developing countries to ensure that the taxes
they impose on the subsidiaries of US multinationals are in a form and at a level that
ensure full creditability against US taxes, and so extract the largest possible subsidy
from the US.
Thus the foreign tax credit is, in eect, a means of reallocating revenue across coun-
tries without distorting the international allocation of capital. It is not, however, an
especially well-targeted means of reallocating revenue, since it extends to investments
in rich countries as much as to those in poorer ones. But there also exists a further
feature of many tax credit systems|though not that of the US|which in eect real-
locates revenue in a way better targeted upon poorer countries but also more likely to
distort investment decision. This is the practice of `tax-sparing,' by which countries
oering foreign tax credits agree to disregard the reduction in host country tax liabil-
ities implied by investment incentives oered there (such as tax holidays), the point
being that such reductions in host country liability would otherwise be exactly undone
by an increased home tax liability. Tax sparing is thus, in eect, a device whereby the
home country nances a subsidy to inward investments oered by the host county: it
is thus an international redistribution of revenues which, since the subsidy encourages
inward investment,22 distorts location decisions. The use of tax sparing might thus be
rationalized along the same lines as the distorting taris encountered in the analysis
above.
This is not to suggest that such institutions as the foreign tax credit and tax sparing|
21Broadly speaking, foreign taxes on the income of foreign subsidiaries is creditable up to the
amount of the US corporation income tax that would otherwise be payable on that income.
22Hines (1998) nds evidence that tax sparing does indeed aect investment decisions.
14let alone taris|should be seen as means that nations have found to put themselves
at a preferred point on the world's utility possibility frontier: there is clearly much
more to them than that. The point is simply that they may indeed have such a role
when direct sharing of tax revenues is dicult; and that even when they distort, these
devices may have a role to play in fully coordinated outcomes.
These observations have implications too for the internal organization of federations.
They point, in particular, to a close link between the extent of horizontal transfers
across the constituent states of federation|serving to consolidate their otherwise dis-
tinct revenue constraints into one|and the desirability of internal arrangements con-
ducive to production eciency in the allocation of the federation's resources. Where
horizontal transfers are weak or non-existent, Pareto-eciency within the federation
may, for example, require the states to adopt measures, such as taxes on trade between
them, that actually interfere with the functioning of the internal market. Conversely,
enforcing the three tenets within federations which|as in the European Union|have
only nascent internal redistribution can actually leave all member states worse o than
they need be.
The results here also have implications for the proper modeling of international tax
issues. Public nance theorists, like trade theorists, make much use of two-country
models. Proposition 2 warns, however, that these models are inherently and seriously
misleading: for since trade balance requires that there then be at least two traded
goods, production ineciency will always be desirable in such settings. To avoid
prejudging the desirability of the three tenets one thus needs a model with at least
three countries. Dimensionality matters for optimal international tax design.23 Indeed
it is the need to think beyond the usual 22 framework that makes interpreting some
of the results here so hard.24 Coming to terms with this complexity is, unfortunately,
essential if one is to build a coherent framework for international tax analysis.
5 Summary and conclusion
The preceding analysis has shown that Pareto-ecient taxation in an international
context may require production ineciency; that is, taris and other policies that
distort world production patterns may actually make all countries better o. This
means that the three principles of international taxation identied at the outset are
not, in general, valid guides to optimal policy. Source-based capital taxes, origin-based
consumption taxes, and subsidies and taris on international trade ows, even though
they may distort production, can nonetheless be Pareto-improving. Of course, these
results in no way suggest that policies that depart in arbitrary ways from traditional
principles are Pareto-improving, and one must beware the danger that|as Edgeworth
23The dimensionality issue here (concerning numbers of countries and goods) is entirely distinct
from that associated with factor price equalization (concerning numbers of factors and goods).
24The simplest case in which the result on the collinearity of tari vectors has force, for instance,
is that in which there are three goods and four countries: at least three goods are needed because,
by normalization, good 1 bears no tari and collinearity of the tari on a single good is vacuous; and
then with less than four countries, Proposition 2(b) implies that taris are the same in all countries.
15(1908, p. 555 ) feared in respect of Bickerdike's (1906) discovery of the optimal
tari|these arguments might aord \... unscrupulous advocates of vulgar Protection
a peculiarly specious pretext for introducing the thin end of the scal wedge." Indeed,
the analysis identies several important cases where policies that cause production
ineciency are denitely not Pareto-ecient.
The key consideration behind the potential for mutual benet from production ine-
ciency is the existence of multiple government budget constraints, implying a potential
gain from transferring revenues, directly or indirectly, among countries. When this
can be done directly, through lump-sum intergovernmental transfers, the separate
budget constraints facing dierent governments are, in eect, merged, and the stan-
dard production-eciency theorem applies. Even if direct intergovernmental transfers
are not possible, an appropriately-designed system of trade interventions, generally
involving osetting taxes and subsidies in dierent countries, may achieve the desired
intergovernmental redistribution of resources without distorting production eciency.
For this purpose, it is necessary that there be sucient degrees of freedom: speci-
cally, at least as many traded commodities as there are countries. Outside these cases,
however, pursuit of conventional wisdom in designing international tax arrangements
may leave all countries worse o than they need be.
16Appendices
A. Proof of Proposition 1
Supposing the initial allocation to be Pareto ecient, the condition y:0Ju << 0S
implies, as noted in the text, that z  (zs) << 0. The conditions y:0Jq = 0 and
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Using in (A.1) both (A.3) and the denition of as







































Part (a) follows from (A.5). Part (b) follows on using (A.6) to write (A.3) as (x0;xs0)0 =
zses
gs:0[IT 1j0T 1;N].
B. Proof of Proposition 2
From part (a) of Proposition 1, it suces to show that zses
g = , independent of s, if
the alternative holds.
Case (a): When explicit lump sum taxes can be deployed, the alternative requires that






S 1, and the conclusion follows.
Case (b): Amongst the conditions for the alternative is that y:0J! = 0. Recalling the
denition in (16), this in turn implies that
M:v = 0T 1 (B.1)
where v  [z1e1
g;:::;zSeS
g]0. Recall too from (6) that market-clearing implies M:S =
00
T 1, so that M has column rank of no more than S  1. If it has precisely that rank,
then v must be collinear with i, and the result follows.
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